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Abstract 
Software is the foundational building material for the engineering of systems, enabling almost 
100% of the integrated functionality of cyber physical systems—especially mission- and 
safety-critical software reliant systems—to the extent that these systems cannot function 
without software. As a result, it is imperative that the DoD has the capability and capacity to 
affordably sustain software-reliant systems and to continually operate and achieve mission 
success in a dynamic threat, cybersecurity, and net-centric environment.  
The Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) Software Engineering Institute (SEI) has been 
performing studies to inform Departmental decisions regarding software sustainment policies 
and programs regarding complex weapon systems. These studies were based on interviews 
and discussions with sustainment centers across all of the Services, case studies on selected 
programs, and a literature review.  
In this paper we present an overview of our initial study regarding the DoD’s organic software 
sustainment infrastructure and its key components related to complex weapon systems, and 
a selection of key themes from our analysis of sustainment practices. There are two key 
takeaway messages. First, software sustainment is not effectively described with a model 
based on hardware (where sustainment can be treated as a discrete series of activities 
intended to restore form, fit, and function). Secondly, software sustainment is really about 
continuous engineering in which the software undergoes a series of engineering activities 
intended to deliver the latest capability to the warfighter, a task which is never “done.” 
Motivation 
Software is the foundational building material for the engineering of systems, 
enabling almost 100% of the integrated functionality of cyber-physical systems—especially 
mission- and safety-critical software-reliant systems—to the extent that these systems 
cannot function without software. There is no plateau in sight for the advancement of 
software technology and its use by the DoD in new systems, as well as to enhance the 
capabilities of legacy systems and extend their operational value far beyond their designed 
service life.  
Software can also be a major a source of defects and potential security 
vulnerabilities with potentially fatal consequences, due to the increased complexity of 
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interactions among embedded software, the hardware platform, and its associated 
subsystems. The dynamics of the cyber environment and the constantly changing nature of 
the cyber threat mean that with software we are never “done.”  
The issues surrounding sustainment become increasingly complex as the DoD’s 
reliance on software increases. For example, the ever-expanding reliance on software 
means that an increasing portion of the acquisition cost as well as the sustainment cost of 
systems is driven by software (NRC, 2010a). There is evidence that it is three to 10 times 
more expensive to mitigate software defects/vulnerabilities in sustainment rather than early 
in acquisition and development. Successfully mitigating this software cost trend, while still 
enhancing warfighter capability, must be an essential element in the DoD’s affordability 
strategy.  
Therefore it is imperative that software sustainment be a priority in defining system 
requirements, design, and development. This means that the software sustainment 
community must be an active participant early in the requirements and engineering process 
and that the Product Support Manager in acquisition programs must be knowledgeable and 
proactive in representing software sustainment equities.  
Another critical challenge is the magnitude of the DoD’s software sustainment 
inventory. The inventory is immense, but there is limited visibility and understanding at the 
enterprise level of the total size, complexity, and characteristics of the DoD’s software 
inventory, which may be trending toward one billion lines of custom developed software 
code or more.1 Additionally, the engineering of systems also relies on an extensive portfolio 
of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) software, government-off-the-shelf (GOTS) software, 
and increasingly on free and open-source software (FOSS). The use of non-custom 
development software is pervasive across all DoD system domains and its use comes with 
significant technical and management challenges. The DoD relies on comprehensive and 
complex information systems to provide almost real time visibility and management of its 
wholesale and retail inventory of parts and supplies, but it has no similar capability for 
software.  
It is imperative that the DoD have the capability and capacity to affordably acquire 
and sustain software-reliant systems to continually operate and achieve mission success in 
a dynamic threat, cyber, and net-centric environment. However, the DoD’s ability to produce 
high-quality software more affordably and efficiently across the system life cycle is a 
strategic challenge (NRC, 2010a). The acquisition and sustainment of software, particularly 
for distributed real-time and embedded systems, remains high risk and more problematic as 
system complexity continues to grow.  
Research Goal, Scope, and Methodology 
Our research goal was to characterize the factors that affect the effectiveness and 
cost of software sustainment in the DoD. For this initial step of our research, we did not 
intend to produce value judgments as to the efficacy or cost-effectiveness of different 
                                            
 
 
1 This is an estimate based on the limited data available and expert judgment. However, we note that 
several experts in the DoD software engineering community have expressed the opinion in 
discussions that the number may be even higher. 
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sustainment choices; rather, we intended to identify and describe the major factors that DoD 
organizations must manage, in order to impact software sustainment performance.  
To provide a manageable focus for our work, we concentrated on describing the 
software sustainment ecosystem as it relates to complex weapon systems. Embedded 
software presents the most technically difficult and resource-intensive software engineering 
challenge because of tightly coupled interfaces, integration with unique hardware, real-time 
requirements, and very high reliability and assurance needs due to life-critical and mission-
critical demands. Of course, the DoD’s software sustainment challenge is broader than the 
software embedded in complex weapon systems. Mission critical non-embedded systems, 
mission support systems (e.g., test equipment, mission planning, engineering models, and 
simulations), and the range of business systems also present significant software 
sustainment challenges. While our initial results can be used to understand the software 
sustainment ecosystem for other types of software intensive systems, a more detailed 
description of how the factors apply to those domains will be a subject of future work.  
Our team leveraged multiple streams of data and information for this study. 
 Literature Search—The body of knowledge related to software engineering is 
extensive. The formal body of knowledge, academic research, and 
practitioner publications has evolved so that there are now various 
communities of interest and professional organizations that focus on software 
engineering.2 However, there has been limited systematic study focused on 
DoD software sustainment, so there is no organized set of literature and 
ongoing study or research agenda to create and refresh a software 
sustainment body of knowledge.  
 SEI DoD Engagements—The SEI has been actively engaged with the military 
services for three decades to provide technical expertise to enhance 
organizational capabilities (processes, practices, and competencies) for 
software engineering across the life cycle and to solve technical challenges 
for specific weapon system and information system programs. This has 
included continuous engagement with the principal Army, Navy, and Air 
Force software sustainment centers to include the provision of knowledge 
and practice to institutionalize CMMI.  
 DoD IPT Report—The SEI had access to the data and results of the DoD 
UAS Software Sustainment Integrated Product Team (IPT) Report. This IPT 
effort, which concluded in 2015, was led by the office of the DASD (MP&P). 
The SEI was invited to serve as an ex officio member of the IPT, which made 
visits to a number of Army, Navy, and Air Force organic software sustainment 
organizations.  
 Interviews with Key Leaders—It was critical that the SEI inform its analysis 
based on the views of decision-makers who influence a range of software 
                                            
 
 
2 For example, the Software Engineering Body of Knowledge (SWEBOK), a community-driven 
approach using an open consensus model to document generally accepted software engineering 
knowledge under the leadership of the IEEE Computer Society 
(https://www.computer.org/web/swebok). A DoD-specific example is the Software Assurance 
Community of Practice. 
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sustainment policies, programs, and resource allocation. To that end, the SEI 
complemented its research with information from meetings with key leaders 
across all three Services, including those in the Senior Executive Service 
(SES), senior managers and staff in OSD, and from industry. This study was 
conducted at the unclassified level, and our interviews with DoD sustainment 
staff were conducted under the conditions of non-attribution to enable an 
open exchange of perspectives with senior leaders, managers, and staff 
engaged in software sustainment. These conversations provided context for 
understanding the evolution of the DoD’s current software sustainment 
posture and enabled the SEI to refine its model of the software sustainment 
ecosystem.  
DoD’s Organic Software Sustainment Organizational Infrastructure 
The DoD’s organic software sustainment organizations successfully respond to a 
range of customer needs and deliver critical software updates and enhancements, often 
under the intense schedule pressure of wartime operations, to deliver critical warfighter 
capability. This organic infrastructure is composed of a number of principal organizations 
and a myriad of other smaller organizations and offices that have not been fully identified 
and characterized. To a large degree, in our view, the critical role and functions of these 
organizations are not well understood or visible. These organic organizations are structured 
and resourced in different ways by each Service, each performing software sustainment 
utilizing a variety of government and contract staffing strategies. The Services employ a 
variety of business model strategies in making decisions about allocating sustainment 
workload across their organic software development capabilities and the defense industrial 
base (DIB), as well as structuring public–private sector partnerships. These decisions are 
made within the context of a number of statutory requirements and DoD policies, such as 
determination of core requirements and the 50% ceiling, measured in dollars, on the amount 
of depot maintenance workload that may be performed by a contract with industry for a 
military department or defense agency during a fiscal year.  
The Nature of Software in Systems 
One of the keys to addressing the software sustainment challenge is to understand 
the nature of software in DoD systems. The characteristics of software relative to hardware 
are generally not well appreciated, especially in relation to how the DoD traditionally uses 
the term maintenance. 
The critically important and growing role of software in defense systems has been 
noted in many prior studies (DSB, 2000; NRC, 2010a, 2010b). This growth is due in many 
ways to the unique characteristics of software, as summarized eloquently in a study by the 
National Academy of Sciences: 
This growth is a natural outcome of the special engineering characteristics of 
software: Software is uniquely unbounded and flexible, having relatively few 
intrinsic limits on the degree to which it can be scaled in complexity and 
capability. Software is an abstract and purely synthetic medium that, for the 
most part, lacks fundamental physical limits and natural constraints. For 
example, unlike physical hardware, software can be delivered and upgraded 
electronically and remotely, greatly facilitating rapid adaptation to changes in 
adversary threats, mission priorities, technology, and other aspects of the 
operating environment. The principal constraint is the human intellectual 
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capacity to understand systems, to build tools to manage them, and to 
provide assurance—all at ever-greater levels of complexity. (NRC, 2010a)  
These aspects of software are not always well understood or at least addressed in 
practice. For example, much of DoD depot policy (and industrial base policy) remains 
hardware-centric, despite software enabling an increasingly large percentage of system 
functionality. Due to its “uniquely unbounded and flexible” nature, the sustainment of 
software operates very differently from that of other building materials of contemporary 
systems.  
Software is not a “physics of failure” domain, which is to say that software itself does 
not wear out or degrade over time. Maintenance at any organizational level for hardware 
typically focuses on returning components categorized as repairable items, such as avionics 
line-replaceable units (LRUs), to their original functional condition and configuration by 
replacing parts, using smaller electronic components, or treating corrosion. This typically 
involves applying standardized processes and procedures for diagnostics and repair. In the 
case of software, sustainment takes the form of making intentional changes to the software 
source code and related work products for many different reasons, not exclusively (or in 
many cases even primarily) driven by correction of failures. These changes are driven by a 
number of goals, such as to correct a flaw, to mitigate a security vulnerability, to make fact-
of-life changes due to systems and system-of-system interface and interoperability impacts, 
and to incorporate system enhancements that deliver greater warfighter capability. 
Demand and funding requirements for software sustainment do not scale with 
operational tempo or the size of the force structure. From a hardware or weapon system 
platform perspective, depot maintenance or sustainment demands and funding are routinely 
forecasted on the basis of the number of reparable units anticipated, taking into account 
certain factors such as reliability, flying hours, miles driven, engine hours, number of 
landings, or calendar time since last overhaul. From a software perspective, sustainment is 
about applying the disciplines of systems and software engineering (knowledge, processes, 
practices, and skills) each time the software is touched.  
Due to the complexity of software, the great majority of the software sustainment 
effort is spent on the analysis of the specific need for a change and then designing, 
implementing, and testing a unique change. Once implemented, it is trivial to make 
additional copies of the new configuration version of the software system, and generally it is 
inexpensive to push out updates for all the instances of the weapon system in the force 
structure inventory. Further, the number of a particular type of weapon system that is in the 
force structure is not the driver of software sustainment. In other words, relying on a “cost 
per asset” analysis can be hugely misleading. Since costs are independent of the quantity of 
a given system in the inventory or force structure, dividing over a fairly small fleet like the B-
2s is a misleading comparison with other systems. Another factor to consider is the 
differences in complexity of systems and the associated complexity of sustainment from 
system to system. Addressing cybersecurity issues is another distinction.  
Software quality is related not only to operational failures but also to technical debt—
that is, the reflection of inadequate attention to the design of the software architecture 
coupled with developers optimizing short-term goals (like the ability to deliver code on time) 
over longer term impacts (such as the need to create clean, well-organized code that is easy 
to maintain). Technical debt, as generally understood, affects the internal quality of the code 
and its extensibility to more easily accommodate change. However, technical debt does not 
necessarily impact behaviors of the software that would be visible to the end user. Technical 
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debt’s impact on architecture and internal software quality directly affects the scope, 
magnitude, and complexity of software sustainment.  
The scope and complexity of the technical debt in an individual program is also 
driven by the complexity of the software supply chain. The number of different suppliers in 
the software supply chain for a weapon system program can be extensive. A program often 
has limited visibility and understanding of the architecture considerations and software 
practices (not only for development but for assurance as well) that each vendor employs 
and the degree to which there is a consistent approach to software development for the 
entire program. From a software sustainment perspective, organic sustainment 
organizations inherit the cumulative technical debt generated from the multiplicity of 
software development efforts on one program.  
An implication of the points highlighted above is that software sustainment is more 
usefully viewed as continuous engineering rather than a set of discrete maintenance 
activities. Software sustainment enables an ongoing evolution of system capability to 
address the changing environments in which DoD systems are deployed, especially related 
to ongoing changes in cyber threats.  
Policy Context  
Software sustainment organizations plan and execute their missions within the 
context of the existing depot maintenance and associated governance environment. As 
highlighted in Figure 1, the DoD, and in turn the Services, promulgate depot maintenance 
policy and guidance based on a number of statutory requirements. These mandates then 
drive decisions relative to planning and executing software sustainment.  
The overall direction and guidance for software sustainment are based on statutory 
requirements in Title 10 USC and DoD policies for depot-level maintenance. Figure 1 
summarizes the relevant Title 10 USC statutes that influence product support and depot 
maintenance decisions. As a result, the legacy of the DoD’s depot maintenance paradigms 
and policies is rooted in a hardware-centric paradigm. In turn, each Service has developed 
its own guidance for implementing the DoD’s policy to address Service software sustainment 
needs within the depot maintenance framework.  
 
 Title 10 USC Laws Influencing Sustainment 
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The DoD’s Depot Source of Repair (DSOR) practices also drive software 
sustainment decisions. In practice, the Program Manager conducts a level of repair analysis 
(LORA) to determine if there is a depot level requirement (DAU, 2017). The PM also 
conducts a core logistics assessment (CLA) to determine in accordance with Title 10 USC § 
2464 if there is a requirement to establish an organic (core) depot maintenance capability 
(i.e., government owned and government operated [GOGO]). This practice evolved from a 
focus on hardware and is now applied to software.  
A key factor that drives software sustainment is the program manager-centric nature 
of decisions about sourcing strategies for the sustainment of specific weapon system 
programs. These program manager decisions ripple through and impact virtually every 
component of the software sustainment ecosystem. These program-specific policy 
decisions, in our view, may not be balanced with considerations for optimizing the DoD 
software sustainment enterprise to contribute to greater enterprise affordability and 
productivity. 
The Software Sustainment Ecosystem Factors 
Based on our findings, we believe that the software sustainment infrastructure is best 
described and understood as an ecosystem composed of interrelated elements. We found 
over and over that the factors that drive software sustainment are highly interrelated. For 
example, it is difficult to discuss the workforce needed to perform necessary sustainment 
activities without first understanding the business model in terms of public-private 
partnerships, which activities can be done by contractors, and which activities need to 
remain in the organic DoD workforce. Decisions about the nature and types of these 
business models may also be influenced by the degree to which the government has 
provisioned for and exercised its technical data rights for a given program at the time of 
developing an acquisition strategy and contract. These decisions have implications for the 
scope of the software sustainment system. Because of the high degree of connectivity that 
exists among the drivers and factors, we use the metaphor of an “ecosystem” to describe 
the interdependencies among these elements; decisions made at any point are affected by 
and affect whole series of other decisions. 
There are many variables that are inherent in this ecosystem, not the least of which 
is time. The time variable is one of the key factors that makes this ecosystem dynamic. 
There is a time dependency among and between certain software sustainment demand 
drivers and the critical elements. For example, demands for software changes are frequent, 
and the underlying technology of software changes rapidly. Failure to invest in software 
quality up front during initial system development creates a bow wave of risk and technical 
debt that may continue for decades. Similarly, inadequate investments early in software 
workforce capital, tools, and engineering processes will increase the cost of sustainment. In 
operation, the software sustainment ecosystem is dynamic.  
Based on our research, we created a framework that describes the software 
sustainment ecosystem, depicted in Figure 2. We abstracted the issues raised in our 
discussions with DoD sustainment stakeholders into six demand drivers and 10 ecosystem 
elements.  
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 The DoD Software Sustainment Ecosystem Framework  
These six demand drivers capture the fact that DoD systems exist in an 
environment that is highly dynamic, where there is a need to respond to constantly changing 
threats and mission needs. This dynamism drives many of the system changes that need to 
be made during software sustainment. For many of these changes, the most cost-effective 
way of implementing the new capability relies on the unique flexibility of software. 
Our work with the DoD software sustainment community continually highlighted an 
array of what some called constraints, factors, or “outside the organization influences” that 
directly impact software sustainment planning and execution. We mapped these 
considerations into the six higher level demand drivers. These demand drivers include policy 
(which may include formal guidance such as the Defense Acquisition Guidance and 
standards) and governance, the nature of the mission, the cyber and mission threat 
environment, funding, technology trends, and regulatory/certification requirements. 
The 10 ecosystem elements, shown as interconnected “bubbles” within Figure 2, 
are the tightly interconnected factors that sustainment organizations need to manage in 
order to effectively and continuously engineer the software. The drivers and elements of this 
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ecosystem represent a virtual spider web of linkages and relationships. The ecosystem 
elements shown in the figure are as follows:  
The four infrastructure elements are the basic, fundamental resources that are 
necessary for the sustainment activities to occur. 
 Systems and Software Engineering Process and Tools—The engineering 
practices to be applied to plan and execute the work. 
 Enabling IT Infrastructure—The information technology environment and 
assets upon which the work must be conducted.  
 Test and Evaluation (T&E)—The mechanisms by which changes made 
during software sustainment are verified as ready to be rolled out to users. 
For DoD weapons systems, significant investments in program-specific 
hardware may be required. 
 Systems Integration Laboratory (SIL)—The SIL is a specific type of T&E 
equipment, providing accurate analysis of the impact of changes, and is 
increasingly important to DoD sustainment practice. 
The three knowledge and expertise elements include the factors that describe how 
the necessary skill sets are brought to bear for sustainment activities and how the 
government grows its organic workforce and gets access to necessary technical 
information—perhaps with some level of interaction with the private sector—in order to 
deliver and deploy the capabilities that need to go to the warfighter. 
 Workforce (Competency and Staffing—The means of accessing a 
sufficient organic workforce with appropriate skill sets. 
 Business Model (Incentives, Workshare)—The strategic decision 
regarding which parts of the work will be done by the organic workforce and 
which by contractors, and how the overall work is managed both technically 
and contractually. 
 Technical Data Rights and Licensing—The tactical decisions governing 
what technical information is necessary to be accessed by the organic 
workforce, and the mechanisms by which they have access. 
Three ungrouped elements complete the ecosystem. 
 Facilities—The physical location that meets the needs of the work (providing 
sufficient space, security levels, etc.). 
 Operational Software Deployment—The mechanisms and strategy by 
which new versions of the software under sustainment are delivered to users. 
 Management and Performance Measurement—The management function 
necessary to organize and monitor the work being conducted to ensure that it 
is executing as planned, and to identify any problems that need to be 
resolved. 
Conclusion 
The DoD’s ability to continually evolve warfighter capability to address the dynamics 
of the vulnerability and thread environment is driven more and more by the affordable and 
timely continuous engineering of a system’s software. However, there has been limited 
enterprise visibility and management of the DoD’s critical organic software sustainment 
infrastructure. This paper provides insights into this complex issue, and we expect to provide 
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more detailed information describing the software sustainment ecosystem when our report is 
cleared for broader distribution.  
We also hope that the current summary can be useful for multiple stakeholders in the 
DoD, as a way to understand the unique issues related to the sustainment of software. 
Software is continuing to provide a greater percentage of the capabilities to be found in DoD 
weapons systems—and providing an increasing percentage of system cost as well. For both 
of these trends, no plateau is in sight. The unique flexibility and usefulness of software will 
make it central to sustainment strategies for adapting systems to the ever-changing mission 
needs and cyber-threat environment for the foreseeable future. We hope that the brief 
synopsis in this paper and the discrete ecosystem factors that we identified help to articulate 
many of the software-specific issues that are needed to do that effectively. 
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